In light of the recent rumblings about passing campaign disclosure laws that would require anyone spending money on speech at or around election time to disclose specifically who they are and more, I think it might be wise to consider Justice Thomas' concurring and dissenting Opinion in Citizens United. Protecting the fundamental right of free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment should be our top priorty. Passing laws of questionable constitutionality that may subject many speakers to harassment, intimidation and retaliation should be avoided.

I will let Justice Thomas' Opinion seak for itself -- I simply condense it here for your consideration --

"JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.

Political speech is entitled to robust protection under the First Amendment. [The corporate speech restriction] of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) has never been reconcilable with that protection. By striking down [the corporate speech restiction],the Court takes an important first step toward restoring full constitutional protection to speech that is “indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular government.” . . . . I dissent from Part IV of the Court’s opinion, however, because the Court’s constitutional analysis does not go far enough. The disclosure, disclaimer, and reporting requirements in BCRA . . . are also unconstitutional.

Congress may not abridge the “right to anonymous speech” based on the “‘simple interest in providing voters with additional relevant information,’” . . . . In continuing to hold otherwise, the Court misapprehends the import of “recent events” that some amici describe “in which donors to certain causes were blacklisted, threatened, or otherwise targeted for retaliation.” . . . . The Court properly recognizes these events as “cause for concern,” but fails to acknowledge their constitutional significance. In my view, amici’s submissions show why the Court’s insistence on upholding [the disclosure provisions] will ultimately prove as misguided (and ill fated) as was its prior approval of [the corporate speech restrictions].

Amici’s examples relate principally to Proposition 8, a state ballot proposition that California voters narrowly passed in the 2008 general election. Proposition 8 amended California’s constitution to provide that “[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.” Any donor who gave more than $100 to any committee supporting or opposing Proposition 8 was required to disclose his full name, street address, occupation, employer’s name (or business name, if self-employed), and the total amount of his contributions. The California Secretary of State was then required to post this information on the Internet.

Some opponents of Proposition 8 compiled this information and created Web sites with maps showing the locations of homes or businesses of Proposition 8 supporters. Many supporters (or their customers) suffered property damage, or threats of physical violence or death, as a result. They cited these incidents in a complaint they filed after the 2008 election, seeking to invalidate California’s mandatory disclosure laws. Supporters recounted being told: “Consider yourself lucky. If I had a gun I would have gunned you down along with each and every other supporter,” or, “we have plans for you and your friends.” Proposition 8 opponents also allegedly harassed the measure’s supporters by defacing or damaging their property. Two religious organizations supporting Proposition 8 reportedly received through the mail envelopes containing a white powdery substance.

Those accounts are consistent with media reports describing Proposition 8-related retaliation. The director of the nonprofit California Musical Theater gave $1,000 to support the initiative; he was forced to resign after artists complained to his employer. The director of the Los Angeles Film Festival was forced to resign after giving $1,500 because opponents threatened to boycott and picket the next festival. And a woman who had managed her popular, family-owned restaurant for 26 years was forced to resignafter she gave $100, because “throngs of [angry] protesters” repeatedly arrived at the restaurant and “shout[ed] ‘shame on you’ at customers.” The police even had to “arriv[e] in riot gear one night toquell the angry mob” at the restaurant. Some supporters of Proposition 8 engaged in similar tactics; one real estate businessman in San Diego who had donated to a group opposing Proposition 8 “received a letter from the Prop. 8 Executive Committee threatening to publish his company’s name if he didn’t also donate to the ‘Yes on 8’ campaign.”

The success of such intimidation tactics has apparently spawned a cottage industry that uses forcibly disclosed donor information to pre-empt citizens’ exercise of their First Amendment rights. Before the 2008 Presidential election, a “newly formed nonprofit group . . . plann[ed] to confront donors to conservative groups, hoping to create a chilling effect that will dry up contributions.” Its leader, “who described his effort as ‘going for the jugular,’” detailed the group’s plan to send a “warning letter . . . alerting donors who might be considering giving to right-wing groups to a variety of potential dangers, including legal trouble, public exposure and watchdog groups digging through their lives.”

These instances of retaliation sufficiently demonstrate why this Court should invalidate mandatory disclosure and reporting requirements. But amici present evidence of yet another reason to do so—the threat of retaliation from elected officials. As amici’s submissions make clear, this threat extends far beyond a single ballot proposition in California. For example, a candidate challenging an incumbent state attorney general reported that some members of the State’s business community feared donating to his campaign because they did not want to cross the incumbent; in his words, “‘I go to so many people and hear the same thing: “I sure hope you beat [the incumbent], but I can’t afford to have my name on your records. He might come after me next.”’” The incumbent won reelection in 2008.

My point is not to express any view on the merits of the political controversies I describe. Rather, it is to demonstrate—using real-world, recent examples—the fallacy in the Court’s conclusion that “[d]isclaimer and disclosure requirements . . . impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities, and do not prevent anyone from speaking.” Of course they do. Disclaimer and disclosure requirements enable private citizens and elected officials to implement political strategies specifically calculated to curtail campaign-related activity and prevent the lawful, peaceful exercise of First Amendment rights.

Now more than ever, [the disclosure requirements] will chill protected speech because—as California voters can attest — “the advent of the Internet” enables “prompt disclosure of expenditures,” which “provide[s]” political opponents “with the information needed” to intimidate and retaliate against their foes. Thus, “disclosure permits citizens . . . to react to the speech of [their political opponents] in a proper”—or undeniably improper—“way” long before a plaintiff could prevail on an as-applied challenge [court challenge].

I cannot endorse a view of the First Amendment that subjects citizens of this Nation to death threats, ruined careers, damaged or defaced property, or pre-emptive and threatening warning letters as the price for engaging in“core political speech, the ‘primary object of First Amendment protection.’” Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s judgment upholding [the campaign disclosure reqirements]."

Justice Thomas' Opinion is worth serious consideration. I condensed the Opinion for easy reading here -- but if you want to see all of his autorities and his citations for his facts -- go to this link and read his opinion for yourself. Justice Thomas' Opinion is the last in the series of Opinions and follows immediately after the Opinion by Justice Stevens --http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-205.pdf

The Alaska Constitution provides greater protection to free speech than does the Federal Constitution. The Legisature should take great care to make sure that whatever law it passes, if any, is consistent with Alaska's own costitutional protections for free speech. The Legislature should also take care to make sure that it is not quelling important political free speech, subjecting average citizens to potential harassment, intimidation and retaliation, in its rush to respond to the United States Supreme Court's recent decision.